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INTRODUCTION
The inauguration of Barack Obama was marred by one of the smallest
constitutional crises in American history. As we all remember, the President
did not quite recite his oath as it appears in the Constitution.' The error bo-
thered enough people that the White House redid the ceremony a day later,
taking care to get the constitutional text exactly right.2 Or that, at least, is
what everyone thinks happened.' What actually happened is more interest-
ing. The second time through, the President again departed from the
Constitution's text.4 But the second time, nobody minded. Or even noticed.
In that unremarked feature of an otherwise trivial affair lies a deep truth
about the role of text in American constitutionalism. And as the outlines of
the great are sometimes visible in the small, careful attention to the
* Professor of Law, The University of Michigan; John Simon Guggenheim Memorial
Foundation Fellow in Constitutional Studies. Special thanks to the students in my 2009 seminar on
problems in constitutional theory. Thanks also to Margia Corner, David Franklin, Don Herzog,
Jocelyn Kennedy, Kerry Monroe, Aryeh Primus, Gil Seinfeld, Leon Wieseltier, and the participants
in a faculty workshop at the University of Michigan Law School. The work of this Essay was sup-
ported in part by the Cook Endowment at the University of Michigan Law School.
I. Compare Barack Obama Oath of Office, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mlYff-
_9MZs (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) (displaying video of inaugural oath on January 20, 2009), with
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (prescribing text of the oath).
2. Barack Obama Re-Takes Oath of Office, http://www.youtube.com/watchv=bq
PzWzC7rA (last visited May 16, 2010) (recording of second taking of the oath on January 21,
2009).
3. See, e.g., Nicole Guadiano, Day 1 capped with inauguration do-over for Obama, USA
TODAY, Jan. 23, 2009 ("The oath took 25 seconds-this time without a flaw."): Michael D. Shear,
Obama Sworn In Again, With Right Words, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2009, at A4; Jeff Zeleny, I Really
Do Swear, Faithfully: Obama and Roberts Try Again, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at Al (describing
the second recitation as "flawless"); Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees (CNN television broadcast Jan.
21,2009).
4. See infra Part I.
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"corrected" inaugural oath can reveal something important about how larger
constitutional questions are resolved.
Consider the more significant issue, now before Congress, of whether to
give the District of Columbia a voting seat in the House of Representatives.
Many people consider giving the District a representative flatly unconstitu-
tional,' and their view has a reasonable basis. The Constitution says that
members of the House shall be chosen "by the People of the several States,"7
and the District of Columbia is not a state. But the kerfuffle over the inaugu-
ral oath suggests two lessons. The first is that the text of the Constitution
need not prevent D.C. from sitting in Congress. The second, however, is that
passing the District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act might have the
unintended effect of delaying the enfranchisement of District residents. If
the inaugural oath played as constitutional farce, passage of the Act might
lead to constitutional tragedy.
To understand why, we should start by going back to the inauguration.
I. THE OATH
Recall what happened on Inauguration Day. According to Article II of
the Constitution, the President is supposed to swear that he will "faithfully
execute the Office of President of the United States."8 When prompting the
President, the Chief Justice mistakenly put the word "faithfully" at the end
of the phrase, so the inauguree swore to "execute the Office of President of
the United States faithfully" instead.' In all likelihood, the error had no legal
significance. But as a matter of statesmanship, botching the Constitution
was unfortunate, and self-appointed watchdogs began to chatter.'o
Just to be sure, the President and the Chief Justice restaged the swear-
ing-in one day later. When Chief Justice Roberts asked whether the
President was ready to take the oath again, President Obama replied, "I
am-and we're going to do it very slowly."" There was no room for mis-
take; everything should be perfect. White House Counsel Greg Craig
emphasized this exacting approach to the oath in an official statement:
5. See District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2009, H.R. 157, 11Ith Cong. § 2(a)
(2009).
6. E.g., The District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 157
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, Illth Cong. 85 (2009) (comments of Professor Jonathan Turley, calling the bill "fla-
grantly unconstitutional").
7. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
8. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
9. See Barack Obama Oath of Office, supra note 1; U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
10. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Oath gives Justice Roberts and Obama some pauses, USA
TODAY, Jan. 21, 2009, at 6A (stating that the "Internet was awash in commentary" after the botched
oath).
I 1. Barack Obama Re-Takes Oath of Office, supra note 2.
92 IVol. 109:91
HeinOnline  -- 109 Mich. L. Rev. 92 2010-2011
Constitutional Expectations
We believe that the oath of office was administered effectively and that the
president was sworn in appropriately yesterday. But the oath appears in the
Constitution itself, and out of an abundance of caution, because there was
one word out of sequence, Chief Justice Roberts administered the oath a
second time.12
Given all that, one might think that the Chief Justice and the President
adhered scrupulously to the text of Article II on their second try. But they
did not. Taking his cue from the Chief Justice, President Obama began his
second attempt at the oath with the words "I, Barack Hussein Obama, do
solemnly swear . . . . "" As should be obvious, Article II does not contain
the words "Barack Hussein Obama." Nor does Article H say "I [insert name
here] do solemnly swear." What the Constitution says, quite clearly, is, "I do
solemnly swear . ... 1" So when President Obama inserted his name be-
tween "I" and "do," he deviated from the text of the Constitution just as
surely as he had the day before.
The point here is not that the President got the oath wrong by inserting
his name, much less that he and Chief Justice Roberts need to do a third
take. For one thing, this second deviation from the text is legally inconse-
quential. But that was true of the oath as spoken on January 20, too. The
important point is that on the second try, the President got the oath exactly
right, albeit without conforming to the words of the Constitution. The first
deviation from the text struck people as wrong-wrong enough to warrant
staging the ritual again. The second deviation from the text struck people as
right-right enough as to be the way that the ritual was conducted under
conditions of maximum exactitude. People who were exercised about the
first textual departure were happy with the second one: the cable news
commentariat and the blogosphere, both of which had field days with the
January 20 oath, seemed fully satisfied by the January 21 version.
The reason why is deeply planted in American legal culture. It has to do
with something we might call constitutional expectations.
II. EXPECTATIONS
Constitutional expectations are intuitions about how the system is sup-
posed to work. They arise from a combination of experience, socialization,
and principle. Obviously, Americans do not all share a single, precisely de-
fined set of expectations. Indeed, conflicts among rival sets of expectations
help to account for many disagreements about constitutional law. Over a
relatively broad domain, however, informed Americans share expectations
about the rules of government. Those expectations are often closely related
to the constitutional text, but the text does not always capture them
12. Steve Benen, Out of an Abundance of Caution, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 22, 2009,
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2009 01/016551.php (quoting statement of
White House General Counsel Greg Craig).
13. Barack Obama Re-Takes Oath of Office, supra note 2.
14. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
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precisely. On the contrary, our shared expectations go well beyond the strict
textual requirements of the Constitution.
We all expect that members of both parties will stand up and applaud
when the President enters the House chamber to deliver a State of the Union
Address. More consequentially, we all expect that elections will be held on a
certain Tuesday in November and that the party in power will not move
election day to a time more favorable for its own partisan political fortunes.
Political parties in other democracies routinely engage in election-timing
gamesmanship, and we do not think that our elected officials are above par-
tisan tactics, but moving election day is something we expect them not to
do. The Constitution does not forbid it; on the contrary, Article I empowers
Congress to pick the date." But as informed and experienced members of
this society, we have a different sense of the rules of the game, and we firm-
ly expect that those rules will be observed.
Constitutional expectations can supplement the Constitution's text. We
all agree that the President may not censor speech critical of his administra-
tion, even though the First Amendment is addressed only to Congress.1 And
sometimes our constitutional expectations actually override the text. For
example, Article III says that "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury."" In practice, criminal defendants in federal
courts routinely waive jury trial, opting to be tried by judges alone. We read
Article III as if it said that a defendant may choose a jury trial, even though
it actually says that a jury trial is mandatory. Almost nobody minds that we
deviate from this text." We think of a jury trial as a right of the accused ra-
ther than a necessary structural feature of adjudication, and we have done
things this way for a long time, so nothing strikes us as strange when a
judge grants a defendant's request to skip the jury. Our constitutional expec-
tations are not offended, and we do not pause much over the language of
Article III, if we notice it at all.
Our shared constitutional expectations explain why the constitutionally
correct form of the inaugural oath began "I, Barack Hussein Obama, do sol-
emnly swear," even though the text of Article II says something else. With
the exception of Lyndon Johnson on the day of his emergency inauguration
aboard Air Force One, every President since Franklin Roosevelt has inserted
his name into the oath.'9 Few Presidents inserted their names prior to Roose-
velt. Some did not personally recite the oath at all, instead merely
15. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
16. U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law...") (emphasis added).
17. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
18. Akhil Amar is a principled exception. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1196 (1991) (arguing based on the text of Article III that criminal
defendants may not constitutionally waive jury trial, despite established practice to the contrary).
19. See Audio recording: President Johnson Taking the Oath of Office: November 22, 1963
and Beyond, http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/kennedy/Oath%200f%200ffice/oath.htm (last
visited Feb. 14, 2010) (downloadable audio of President Johnson taking the Oath of Office aboard
Air Force One). Recordings and accounts of all other takings of the Inaugural Oath since 1932 are
on file with the author.
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responding "I do" after someone else recited the oath in question form.20 But
as a result of a nearly continuous practice over the last seventy-six years,
each of us today who remembers previous inaugurations--or has seen re-
cordings or fictionalized representations-expects to hear the name. Those
expectations define the operative constitutional norm, even though the text
reads differently.
Our organic sense of the ritual defines the constitutional norm so power-
fully that we depart from the text even when going slowly and carefully so
as to get every little thing exactly right. This does not mean that we disre-
spect the Constitution. The Constitution is sacred to Americans, just as
Scripture is sacred to believers. But as people of many faiths know, sacred
texts are often approached through the lens of traditional practice, and the
expectations that practice creates are often more powerful than words on
paper. So when we have a settled practice of doing something different from
what is written in the text, the text tends to give way.
When that happens, Americans rarely say, "We are now departing from
the text." Our genuine regard for the document and our self-conception as a
political community governed under a written constitution are too powerful
to permit that move, or at least to permit it frequently. More often, we re-
read the text to make it match our practices, either by giving new content to
specific terms or by deciding that what a textual passage reasonably means
is different from what it literally says. And sometimes-indeed, more often
than most of us realize-we just stop noticing that the text says what it does.
III. THE ACT
Four weeks after the inaugural mulligan, the Senate focused on a more
consequential parsing of the Constitution's text. The issue was the District
of Columbia House Voting Rights Act. As its name suggests, this Act would
give the people of Washington, D.C., a voting seat in the House of Repre-
sentatives. Many of the Act's opponents have acknowledged that the
continuing denial of voting representation to the half-million Americans
living in the District is unjust. 22 But unfortunately, most of them say, the
20. For what it is worth, a few preliminary drafts of Article II at the constitutional convention
of 1787 read "I, - , solemnly swear," suggesting that if the Framers made a choice on
this matter, it was against the insertion of names. See 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 573 (Philip
B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000).
21. District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2009, H.R. 157. 111th Cong. § 2(a)
(2009).
22. See Hearing on H.R. 157 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and
Civil Liberties, supra note 6, at 84-85 (comments of Professor Jonathan Turley, saying that the
continuing disfranchisement of District residents is a "great wrong"); Comm. ON HOMELAND SEC. &
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRs, REP. ON DISTRIcT OF COLUMBIA HOUSE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 2007, S.
REP. No. 110-123, at 22 (2007) (additional views of Senators Tom Coburn and Ted Stevens) ("The
lack of Congressional representation for American citizens living in the District of Columbia is a
grave injustice.").
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Constitution does not permit Congress to fix the problem, because Article I
limits membership in Congress to states.2
Sixty-one senators voted to approve the bill. The vote was not entirely
along party lines-six Republicans were among the majority, and two De-
mocrats dissented -- but many commentators view the Act in simple
partisan terms. Everyone knows that a D.C. representative would be a De-
mocrat. (Indeed, everyone knows that her name would be Eleanor Holmes
Norton.) To secure some Republican support, the Act was written to add a
27predictably Republican seat in Utah as well as a seat for D.C., but that
wrinkle maintains partisan balance only in the short term. Utah's entitlement
to an extra seat would expire in 2013," and the District of Columbia's repre-
sentation would continue indefinitely. So given the text of Article I, it is easy
to see Democratic support for the Act as a simple case of partisan interest
overcoming constitutional obligation.
Given a certain set of constitutional expectations, awarding D.C. a rep-
resentative would indeed be unconstitutional, and perhaps flagrantly so. But
the Constitution only bars D.C. from the House if Article I is read with that
particular set of expectations. The difficult and legitimately contestable
question that the present conflict poses is whether those expectations should
be permitted to determine how we read the Constitution, even at the expense
of keeping half a million Americans unrepresented in Congress.
The argument that the Act is unconstitutional has a reasonable basis. Ar-
ticle I, Section 2 says that the House of Representatives "shall be composed
of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several
States. . . ."2 9 The District of Columbia is not a state. Accordingly, the con-
stitutional objection runs, admitting D.C. to the House would ignore the
written requirements of Section 2. And that cannot possibly be acceptable.30
Yet this argument is not as tight as it seems, because our system for electing
members of Congress already-and uncontroversially-deviates from the
text of Section 2 on a regular basis. If we were more aware of those devia-
tions, the argument that Section 2 requires excluding D.C. might have less
weight. But like the practice of inserting the President's name in the inaugu-
ral oath, our accustomed departures from the text of Section 2 have become
23. See COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, supra note 22, at 29.
24. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Cong. on Passage of S. 160 As Amended,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll-call-lists/rollcallvote-cfm.cfm?congress= I1l&session
=1 &vote-00073 (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) (recording roll-call vote).
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., George F. Will, In a D.C. State of Mind, WASH. PosT, Feb. 5, 2009, at Al7.
27. District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2009, H.R. 157, 111th Cong §§ 3-4
(2009).
28. See id.
29. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 157 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights,
and Civil Liberties supra note 6, at 21-22 (comments of Professor Jonathan Turley) (noting that the
constitutional question simply comes down to the plain meaning of "State" under Article 1, § 2).
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well integrated into our constitutional expectations. We tend not to notice
them.
Consider something we might call the Scott Murphy problem, after the
man who now represents New York's Twentieth District in the House of
Representatives. After President Obama nominated then-Senator Hillary
Clinton to be secretary of state, New York Governor David Patterson named
Kirsten Gillibrand-then the representative for the Twentieth District-to
replace Clinton in the Senate." In April 2009, Murphy won a special elec-
32tion held to replace Gillibrand. Now the problem: when will Murphy run
for re-election? Again, Article I, Section 2 says that the House of Represen-
tatives "shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the
People of the several States."" But Murphy, who was elected in 2009, will
run for re-election in 2010-that is, in two consecutive years, rather than
every second year as required by the text. This is standard practice. When a
representative dies or resigns, the seat is filled as quickly as possible by spe-
cial election, and the newly chosen representative does not wait two full
years from the special election to run again. He runs on the normal calendar,
even if that means that he is chosen in two consecutive years, or twice in the
same year, rather than every second year. As a result, the House regularly
contains members who are not chosen quite as described in the text. Nobody
minds. Nobody should. This is the way we do things, and nothing about it
contradicts expectations that Americans hold in light of their educations,
experiences, or values. Absent such a contradiction, we might not even no-
tice that our practice deviates from the text.
Once we do notice the textual problem, we have three options. One,
which we will surely not choose, is to discontinue the practice and require
Murphy to wait until 2011 to run for re-election. The second, which we can
think of as a hard textualist solution, is to find a way to read the words of
Article I, Section 2 so as to permit our traditional practice. The third, which
we can think of as a soft textualist solution, is to decide that the phrase
"every second year" is not reasonably read to apply in a literal or wooden
way to the situation of special elections.
It is not difficult to identify hard textualist solutions. Try this one. Arti-
cle I, Section 2 says that the House "shall be composed of Members chosen
every second Year." 4 That is a problem if the House can only include the
people who compose it. But maybe the word "composed" does not entail
exclusivity, such that some representatives are members of the House but
without being part of its "composition." If we were inclined in this direction,
we could have a long argument, by turns tendentious and unintentionally
comical, about the meaning of "composed." (Might a football game be
31. Danny Hakim & Nicholas Confessore, Paterson to Pick a Senator Today, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 2009, at Al.
32. Irene Jay Liu & Leigh Hornbeck, Murphy going to Congress, ALBANY TIMES UNION,
Apr. 25, 2009, available at http://www.timesunion.com/ASPStories/story.asp?StorylD=793690.
33. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 2, cl. I (emphasis added).
34. Id.
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"composed" of four quarters, even though halftime is also part of the game?
Might a turkey sandwich be "composed" of bread and turkey, even if it also
has a little mustard? What did James Madison put on his turkey sand-
wiches?) If we ultimately decided that "composed" can bear a non-totalizing
meaning, such that the 400-plus representatives elected every second year
"compose" the House but several others can come along for the ride, we
could reconcile the practice we have come to expect with the literal terms of
the text. And as practical constitutional lawyers have understood since the
time of John Marshall, the fact that this view of "composed" would yield
such a reconciliation is a reason to lean toward that reading."
This practical wisdom rests on the understanding that the verbal gym-
nastics of hard textualism are not the real reasons why people who enter the
House at special elections can run for re-election on the regular schedule
rather than having to wait for two full years. The real reasons lie in our in-
tuitions about the way the system would sensibly work. This view of the
matter is closer to soft textualism: if it doesn't make sense to impose the
"every second year" rule woodenly in cases involving special elections, then
we say that insisting on a literal reading is not a mature or a reasonable way
of showing respect for the text.
But why do some literal readings seem obtuse, and why do some
non-literal readings seem reasonable? The chief answer lies in our constitu-
tional expectations. Where our expectations match the literal text, we think
of following the words carefully as demonstrating fidelity rather than small-
mindedness. Where our expectations diverge from literal readings, we may
regard literalism as cramped and juvenile. Accordingly, the soft textualist is
willing to read "every second year" flexibly because our practice has not
conformed to it literally. The hard textualist may be forced instead to adopt a
particular view of the word "composed." But we can be certain that both of
them will read the text through their constitutional expectations. Just as no-
body thinks that President Obama needs to take the oath a third time,
nobody thinks that Congressman Murphy needs to wait until 2011 to run for
re-election.
IV. CHANGE
For constitutional expectations to eclipse or to recast the text, they must
be strongly held or widely shared. When they are not, we often get conflict,
including conflict over textual meaning. To be sure, conflict over the mean-
ing of a text is sometimes just garden-variety interpretive disagreement. But
when one side of a constitutional conflict endorses an innovative position
that the other side thinks plainly contradicts the text, it is sometimes the case
that the innovators have a new set of constitutional expectations. At that
point, the conflict is not finally about the text. It is about whether the inno-
35. See, e.g., M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401-02 (1819) (writing that the fact of
the existence of the Bank of the United States counseled construing terms in the Constitution to be
compatible with the existence of the Bank, if possible).
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vators can destabilize an existing set of expectations. In such a conflict, de-
fenders of the old arrangement may sincerely understand themselves as
standing up for the text, plain and simple. But if decisionmakers adopt a
new perspective about how government ought to work-if they can replace
their old expectations with something new-then new ways of seeing the
text will follow.
A. In General
That raises a great question of constitutional development: what makes
constitutional expectations change? There is no formulaic answer. Some-
times new problems make people rethink their values and their institutional
arrangements. For example, the Great Depression prompted many Ameri-
cans to reevaluate the allocation of power between the federal and state
governments.16 Similarly, the confrontation with Nazi Germany and the So-
viet Union prompted major changes in constitutional law's regard for racial
equality, free speech, and open democratic politics." Sometimes a rising
generation has different experiences, educations, or demographics from
those of the generation it replaces: Justice Sotomayor's cohort may question
things that Justice Souter's took for granted. Sometimes political move-
ments persuade decisionmakers to see American ideals, and American
history, in ways that require new understandings of the Constitution." Most
Supreme Court Justices play some role in shaping constitutional expecta-
tions, but few have as much effect as Franklin Roosevelt, Ronald Reagan, or
Martin Luther King. And in the struggle among different sets of constitu-
tional expectations, the field of battle can be as wide, and the means of
persuasion as varied, as they are in other struggles over prevailing social,
political, or intellectual assumptions. In the decade before the Supreme
Court decided Brown v. Board of Education," Harry Truman decided to in-
tegrate the armed forces" and Branch Rickey decided to integrate Major
League Baseball;4 ' both changes made it easier for millions of Americans-
some of them judges-to imagine the end of segregation.42 Sergeant Joe
Friday played an unquantifiable role in making ordinary Americans
36. See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 105-30 (1991).
37. See generally RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 177-233
(1999).
38. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006).
39. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
40. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS 85-86 (2000).
41. See, e.g., JULES TYGIEL, BASEBALL'S GREAT EXPERIMENT: JACKIE ROBINSON AND His
LEGACY 54 (2008).
42. See Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1537, 1547 (2004).
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expect Miranda warnings to accompany arrests, 43 and the cultural changes
that helped make Lawrence v. Texas" possible can be understood partly as
William Rehnquist losing ground to Will and Grace.
Obviously, this account is in tension with the idea that legitimate consti-
tutional change comes only through formal amendments that change the
text.45 But that idea does not capture most of the real constitutional change
46that has occurred in American history. We understand the Fourteenth
47Amendment to prohibit racial segregation, as courts a hundred years ago
did not.4 The text has not changed, but the dominant set of values has, and
mainstream Americans read the Constitution in light of their new perspec-
tive. Similarly, the Supreme Court's recent announcement that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to own firearms49 does not reflect
the discovery of a heretofore neglected but inherently correct reading of the
text. It is a victory for a political movement that, over the course of decades,
persuaded many people to adopt a certain view of that text.o The gun rights
movement's persuasive efforts did not just involve arguments about the
words in the Second Amendment. They also involved appeals to values and
heroic retellings of salient parts of American history.-" Their success has
brought constitutional change through the same mechanism that drives most
constitutional development: a change in understanding among the decision-
making class, and therefore a change in constitutional expectations.
B. In Particular
Giving the District of Columbia a voting seat in the House of Represen-
tatives would be, if it occurred, the third act in a long-running drama
featuring shifting constitutional expectations about the District. The first act
concerned an issue of equal access to the legal system. The second act dealt
with rights against racial discrimination. The third act, if it comes, will ad-
43. See LUCAs A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 400 (2000)
(describing the incorporation of the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
into the standard script of the popular television show Dragnet, on which Sergeant Friday was a
main character).
44. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a law prohibiting sexual conduct between same-sex
partners).
45. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 551-52 (1994) (maintaining that the sole legitimate means of altering
constitutional law is formal constitutional amendment).
46. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1457, 1469-78 (2001) (enumerating examples of constitutional change that have come without
formal amendment).
47. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
48. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
49. McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. - (2010); District of Columbia v. Helier, 128 S. Ct.
2783 (2008).
50. See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism As Popular Constitutionalism in Heller,
122 HARv. L. REV. 191 (2008).
51. Id. at 196.
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dress political representation. All in all, the story is about the triumph of a
modem vision of constitutionalism on which equal individual rights are the
cornerstone of constitutional law-a vision that is partly the product of the
twentieth-century confrontation with European totalitarianism. 2 As that vi-
sion has become more powerful in American constitutional expectations, it
has become harder and harder to maintain a regime in which District resi-
dents are denied basic rights that other Americans enjoy.
1. Access to law. The technical issue in the first act was the doctrine of di-
versity jurisdiction. In the words of Article III of the Constitution, federal
courts can exercise jurisdiction in controversies "between Citizens of different
States." If Marvin Michigander sues Patricia Pennsylvanian in the courts of
either Michigan or Pennsylvania, we might worry about bias toward the
hometown party. Diversity jurisdiction permits the suit to proceed in the more
neutral forum of a federal court.54 In 1940, Congress authorized the federal
courts to play the same role in lawsuits where one party resided in the District
of Columbia." The logic is easy. If Wally Washingtonian sues Mary Mary-
lander in the local courts of either D.C. or Maryland, the home-field
advantage problem is just as great as when Michigander sues Pennsylvanian.
Putting the case in a federal court is again a potential solution. The trouble, of
course, is that the District of Columbia is not a state, and the Constitution au-
thorizes diversity jurisdiction only for controversies "between Citizens of
different States." So by letting people from D.C. play the game on the same
terms as everybody else, Congress may have violated the Constitution.
In National Mutual Insurance Company v. Tidewater Transfer Company
("Tidewater"), the Supreme Court addressed the issue and fractured badly. 7
Justice Rutledge argued that D.C. should, for this purpose, be treated as if it
were a state." Justice Frankfurter insisted that the District is not a state and
cannot possibly be considered one.9 And Justice Jackson articulated a com-
plex theory-ingenious to some,a bizarre to others 1-under which
52. See PRIMUs, supra note 37.
53. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
54. E.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945) ("Diversity jurisdiction is
founded on assurance to non-resident litigants of courts free from susceptibility to potential local
bias."). This does not mean that no other rationales for the rule have been advanced. See, e.g., Henry
J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REV. 483, 495-97 (1928)
(arguing that diversity jurisdiction was established to provide parties with access to business-
friendly federal common law and out of concern that state courts might be biased against creditors).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(e) (1940) (stating that for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the
District of Columbia is to be treated as a state).
56. U.S. CoNsT. art. In, § 2, cl. 1.
57. 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
58. Id. at 604-26 (Rutledge, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Murphy, J.).
59. Id. at 646-55 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting, joined by Reed, J.).
60. See, e.g., Gil Seinfeld, Article 1, Article III, and the Limits of Enumeration, 108 MICH. L.
REv. 1389 (2010).
61. See, e.g., Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court and the Attrition of State Power, 10
STAN. L. REV. 274, 293-94 (1958); Louis H. Pollak, Book Review, 65 YALE L.J. 749, 754 n.20
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Congress had not authorized the federal courts to exercise diversity jurisdic-
tion in cases involving District residents but had instead (and legitimately)
given the federal courts a separate function that looked like, but was not,
diversity jurisdiction.62 None of these three positions commanded a majority.
But together the Jackson and Rutledge opinions garnered five votes in favor
of upholding Congress's law. So over the loud protests of the text-wielding
dissenters,63 Tidewater established that a District resident can sue people
from Maryland in federal court, albeit without a clear explanation of why.
And that is the law to this day.
Over the decades, something interesting has happened to the way that
lawyers think about Tidewater. When a federal court hears a case between a
D.C. resident and a non-D.C. resident in 2010, we just say that the court is
65exercising diversity jurisdiction. It is cumbersome to say, "This might be
diversity jurisdiction, or it might be some other complicated thing that Ro-
bert Jackson believed in." And the fact that courts have now done the thing
thousands of times has rendered it normal. So today nobody blinks when we
say that federal courts exercise diversity jurisdiction over cases involving
District residents, even though the text of Article III still clearly speaks of
cases "between Citizens of different States." Nobody thinks there is any-
thing normatively wrong with giving D.C. residents access to law on the
same terms as everyone else, and experience over time has made it seem a
part of the system like, any other. Our constitutional expectations have
shifted: what was once a fighting issue has become a historical footnote.
2. Racial equality. The second act featured equal protection. When the
Supreme Court heard argument in Brown v. Board of Education, it also
considered a companion case challenging school segregation in Washington,
D.C.6 Brown was decided under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which directs that "No State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."68 But again,
the District is not a state, so the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply
there. Absent some creative solution, the Supreme Court faced the prospect
of ordering the desegregation of schools from Delaware to Kansas while
leaving segregation in the nation's capital untouched.
(1956) (reviewing ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF Gov-
ERNMENT (1955)).
62. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (plurality opinion of Jackson, J.,
joined by Black & Burton, JJ.).
63. Id. at 652-53 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (denouncing the Court's result as contrary to
the language of Article M, the "whole history of the federal judiciary,' and sound constitutional
policy).
64. See, e.g., Vreven v. Am. Ass'n of Retired Pers., 604 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12 n.3 (D.D.C. 2009)
(recognizing diversity jurisdiction in a suit between a Maryland resident and a D.C. corporation).
65. See id.
66. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
67. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding unconstitutional the racial segregation
of public schools in the District of Columbia).
68. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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That did not happen. The felt imperative to apply the racial equality
norm everywhere was too strong.6 9 So on the same day in 1954 when it de-
cided Brown, the Court announced in Bolling v. Sharpe that racial
segregation in the District violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment,70 which says that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.",7 The Fifth Amendment binds the
federal government and therefore the District of Columbia. Later lawyers
described this move by saying that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause incorporates the content of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-
tection Clause.72
Measured by the standards of conventional legal interpretation, Bolling
was strange. In addition to its Equal Protection Clause, the Fourteenth
Amendment contains a Due Process Clause forbidding states to "deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."74 If the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment carries the content of the Equal
Protection Clause, many people reasoned, so does the identically worded
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-and that would make
the Equal Protection Clause redundant. Partly on these grounds, the Court
prior to 1954 routinely rejected the idea that the Fifth Amendment could
support equal protection claims, 7  and many technically proficient lawyers
69. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Fourteenth Amendment: A Second American Revo-
lution or the Logical Culmination of the Tradition?, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1159, 1162 n.14 (1992)
("As a matter of judicial statecraft, the imperative in Bolling was clear.").
70. 347 U.S. 497.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
72. See, e.g., JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
32(1980).
73. See Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 975, 977 & n.7 (2004) (col-
lecting objections to the reasoning of Bolling).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
75. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (upholding military
curfew for persons of Japanese descent and declaring that the Fifth Amendment contains no Equal
Protection Clause); Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943) (upholding statute
giving tax advantage to certain property owners, because "[u]nlike the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Fifth contains no equal protection clause and it provides no guaranty against discriminatory legisla-
tion by Congress"). This is not to say that the pre-Bolling Court always rejected any suggestion that
the federal government was bound by some sort of constitutional equality requirement. After all, any
legal system that respects the idea that like cases should be treated alike entails a kind of equality
norm. Even before Bolling, therefore, the Court acknowledged some minimal requirement of equal-
ity in adjudication. See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921) ("Our whole system of
law is predicated on the general fundamental principle of equality of application of the law."). But
that norm did virtually none of the work that the Equal Protection Clause would later do. (Consider,
after all, that that kind of equality norm was necessarily present in the constitutional system from
the beginning, long before the Equal Protection Clause existed.) In the years leading up to Bolling,
however, the Court became more solicitous of a thicker equality norm running against the federal
government, albeit while still hanging on to the formal proposition that equal protection itself ran
only against the states. See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 35 (1948) (striking down a racially
restrictive covenant partly on the grounds that "the public policy of the United States," albeit not the
Constitution, imposed an antidiscrimination norm on the federal government); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (stating that laws curtailing the civil rights of particular racial
groups are subject to rigid scrutiny, but without accepting the idea that the category of constitutional
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considered Bolling's reasoning absurd. Even a generation later, John Hart
Ely would pronounce Bolling "gibberish,"" and Lawrence Lessig would
lament the "embarrassing textual gap" with which the decision's defenders
must reckon."
Crucially, however, Bolling's defenders quickly came to include virtu-
ally all respectable opinion in American law, Ely and Lessig included." The
decision was 9-0 in the Supreme Court. Justice Frankfurter signed on in
spite of his dissent in Tidewater, as did the arch-textualist Justice Hugo
Black. 9 Not surprisingly, segregationists proclaimed the Court lawless. In a
bill proposing the impeachment of several Supreme Court Justices, the
Georgia legislature adduced Bolling as evidence that the Justices had
stopped paying any attention to the words of the Constitution.80 But as offi-
cial racial discrimination became a consensus evil, Bolling ceased to have
detractors. In his Supreme Court confirmation hearings in 1987, Judge Ro-
bert Bork pronounced himself willing to hack away a good deal of modem
constitutional law in the name of the integrity of the Constitution itself-but
he would not dream, he said, of overruling Bolling."
For a while, the oddity of Bolling's interpretation of the Fifth Amend-
ment remained visible in the legal culture. Courts sometimes continued to
write as if there were some substantive difference between the equality rules
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which apply to the states, and the equality
rules of the Fifth Amendment, which apply to the District under the
authority of Bolling.82 But over time the rules for handling the District con-
verged with the more general rules. As lawyers lost any intuitive sense that
non-discrimination principles should have less force against the federal
government than against the states, they started treating the two sets of cases
interchangeably." Within a generation, revisionism had set in: in 1975 the
Supreme Court flatly declared that its approach to equal protection claims
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments had "always been precisely the
equal protection applies to the federal government). The timing of this change was not arbitrary; it
came just as the confrontation with Nazi Germany and the imperatives of the early Cold War
prompted American constitutional decisionmakers to take racial equality more seriously. See PRi-
MUs, supra note 37, at 187-89.
76. See ELY, supra note 72.
77. See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 395, 409 (1995).
78. See ELY, supra note 72; Lessig, supra note 77, at 409-10; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some
Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100
MIcH. L. REV. 2062, 2365 (2002) (describing Bolling as "universally accepted").
79. On Justice Black as a hard-core textualist, see, for example, SANFORD LEVINSON, CON-
STITUTIONAL FAITH 31-32 (1988).
80. See Impeachment of Certain U.S. Supreme Court Justices, H.R.J. Res. 100, 1957 Gen.
Assem. (Ga. 1957).
81. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. pt. 1, 287-88 (1989).
82. See, e.g., Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964) (asserting, as the Court routinely
did before Bolling, that the Fifth Amendment contains no Equal Protection Clause).
83. See Primus, supra note 73, at 989.
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same."8 Just as the jurisprudential oddity of Tidewater became normalized
over time, so did Bolling's radical reading of the Fifth Amendment. And
today law students and laypeople alike consider it bizarre that the constitu-
tional rules regarding discrimination would ever have been any different in
the District of Columbia from what they are in Alabama or New York.
3. Representation in Congress. Like Congress's extension of diversity
jurisdiction to the District in 1940 or the Supreme Court's ordering school
desegregation there in 1954, the proposal to give the District voting repre-
sentation in Congress today faces sincere opposition based on constitutional
text. Article I, Section 2, clause (i) does say that the House of Representa-
tives "shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the
People of the several States,"5 and Article I, Section 2, clause (ii) does say
that "[n]o Person shall be a Representative who shall not .. . when elected,
be an Inhabitant of the State in which he shall be chosen." 6 But if the text
were the complete basis of opposition, the problem would be easily solved,
because it is possible to read these clauses in a way that permits representa-
tion for Washington, D.C. To be sure, the fact that the clauses can be read to
permit that representation does not prove that they should be read to do so.
But at the very least, the availability of readings that permit a representative
for D.C. suggests that reading the text to prohibit representation is rooted in
decisions of value, or in constitutional expectations, rather than being dic-
tated by the text of the Constitution alone.
As described earlier, the word "composed" in clause (i) need not entail
exclusivity; perhaps the House can include people who do not help "com-
pose" it.17 If so, clause (i) does not bar D.C. from the House. If not, it is
unclear why Scott Murphy can run for re-election before 2011. And we can
dissolve the apparent obstacle of clause (ii) by reading "State" as a generic
placeholder noun for "jurisdiction represented" rather than as implying that
all representatives must be from states, just as we read "he" three words
later as a generic placeholder for "that person" rather than as implying that
all representatives must be men. Nothing is more textually problematic
about reading "State" as a generic term that can include the District of Co-
lumbia in Article I, where the issue is congressional representation, than in
Article III, where the issue is diversity jurisdiction. Similarly, the idea that
"composed" need not entail exclusivity is no more textually problematic
than the equation of "due process" with "equal protection" that has become
orthodox since Bolling, or than reading "the trial of all crimes shall be by
84. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975). The possibility of some
daylight between the two Amendments' versions of equal protection remained articulable for a bit
longer, as some Justices suggested that Congress might have more leeway than states to implement
race-conscious affirmative action. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490
(1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J.). By the 1990s, however,
the Court settled on the view that equal protection is the same across the board, whether against the
federal government or the states. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
85. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
86. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
87. See supra Part II.
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jury" to mean "may be by jury at the defendant's option,"-or, for that mat-
ter, than inserting the words "Barack Hussein Obama" between "I" and "do
solemnly swear" in Article II.
Perhaps this hard-textualist flyspecking will not seem like a good way to
resolve important constitutional issues. But the point of the exercise is show
that the real problem with interpreting Article I to permit D.C. to sit in Con-
gress is not a matter of hard textualism. The real problem is that permitting
representation for the District of Columbia is at variance with many people's
strong constitutional expectations. We are accustomed to Congress as a body
for states only, and we have internalized this sense of how the system is
supposed to work. Once that expectation is in place, it can easily find con-
firmation in the text of Article I, even though that text does not require it. If
you are sure that D.C. cannot sit in Congress, you may hold fast to a (per-
fectly plausible) reading of Article I that supports that conclusion. And as
Karl Llewellyn once said, "What satisfies the conscience lulls the mind."8
As long as people's constitutional expectations firmly support excluding
D.C. from Congress, they will not wonder whether the text could be read in
a different way.
Suppose, however, that constitutional expectations were to shift on the
issue of representation for D.C., just as they earlier shifted on the question
of whether the Constitution requires the same racial equality regime in the
District that it requires everywhere else. Suppose, in other words, that large
majorities of American officials came to believe that our basic constitutional
values demand letting the residents of Washington, D.C., vote and be repre-
sented. A different set of textual readings would then seem natural. To be
sure, the new received wisdom in American law would not necessarily be
the one that I have suggested about the meaning of "composed." Perhaps a
different textual reconciliation would emerge. Or perhaps the prevailing ex-
planation would not take the form of hard textualism at all. Constitutional
lawyers might simply learn to shrug their shoulders at the mismatch be-
tween the language of Section 2 and the fact of representation for D.C., just
as they now overlook the practice of letting criminal defendants waive jury
trial. If pushed, they might say that mature respect for the constitutional text
means reading it in a reasonable way rather than a crabbed and literal one.
But one way or another, the text would not prohibit the practice.
Such a shift is almost surely in progress. Sixty-one senators, including a
small handful of Republicans, recently voted to let D.C. sit in Congress. 9
No less a conservative lawman than Kenneth Starr is publicly supporting the
change.90 And when Eleanor Holmes Norton appears on The Colbert Report
88. K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 10 (1934).
89. See U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Cong. on Passage of S. 160 As Amended, supra
note 24 (including among the yea votes Republican Senators Susan Collins, Orrin Hatch, Richard
Lugar, Olympia Snowe, Arlen Specter, and George Voinovich).
90. See Kenneth Starr & Patricia M. Wald, Congress Has the Authority to Do Right by D.C.,
WASH. PosT, Sept. 17, 2006, at B8 (arguing that Congress may and should give the District of Co-
lumbia a voting seat in the House of Representatives).
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and invokes the heroic American tradition of expanding political equality,
she is bidding to change the constitutional expectations of her audience.9 '
Just as other marginalized groups have achieved constitutional equality by
slow degrees, residents of the District of Columbia may be progressing from
access to law (Tidewater) to equal individual rights (Bolling) to participation
in the lawmaking process (in a case yet to be named).
Each increment of that change makes the next increment more likely.
Tidewater and Bolling are outgrowths of a deep social change, but they are
not merely reflections of that change. Once they are part of the law, they
also function as causal forces increasing the momentum of that change. That
District residents are treated interchangeably with residents of states for
more and more constitutional purposes helps condition Americans to expect
such similarity of treatment more broadly, rather than to expect that the Dis-
trict will be treated as a constitutional anomaly. To be sure, the expectation
that the District is anomalous remains alive, as the controversy over con-
gressional representation demonstrates. But the strength of that
expectation-or perhaps the balance between the expectation of anomaly
and the expectation that the Constitution applies in the Nation's capital more
or less as it does everywhere else-is shaped in part by the fact that the Dis-
trict's status is less anomalous than it once was. A future case testing the
constitutionality of a law granting the District a voting seat in the House of
Representatives would be decided under conditions that Bolling and Tidewa-
ter helped to shape, as well as in a world whose deeper conditions helped
give rise to Bolling and Tidewater themselves.
In the best-case scenario, the judges who are asked to rule in that future
case would avoid reflexively reading Article I through an old set of expecta-
tions. Indeed, it is precisely when existing expectations might be seriously
unjust that courts should think most critically about whether those expecta-
tions are finally entitled to the force of law. Good judges would recognize
that the best resolution of the D.C. voting issue depends on the answers to
deeper questions. Does the long-established practice of excluding the Dis-
trict justify the continuing disfranchisement of the people living there? Does
it reflect a conscious choice by the Founders, and if so, how much authority
does such a choice have centuries later? Are there any sound reasons other
than a possible obligation to abide by a past decision for denying D.C. resi-
dents representation today? Rather than taking the text of Article I to
prohibit their asking these questions, perceptive judges might understand
that the answers to these questions are crucial to figuring out the best read-
ing of Article I. And if these deeper questions are too subjective to be
entrusted to judges, the solution is for courts to decline to rule on the
91. See The Colbert Report (Comedy Central television broadcast Feb. 20, 2009) (featuring
as guest District of Columbia Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton, making the argument that
American fairness requires letting District residents vote).
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issue-that is, to declare the matter nonjusticiable-rather than to decide the
case on the basis of less appropriate questions.92
C. Timing
To recognize that the Constitution might permit D.C. to sit in the House,
a court would have to overcome a traditional set of constitutional expecta-
tions. That might happen before too long. But it is unlikely to happen right
now. The majority of Supreme Court Justices sitting in 2010 probably still
regard the exclusion of D.C. from Congress as deeply normal. As a result,
the Court might find it hard to see past the apparent obstacles of Article I.
So consider a final irony. If the present District of Columbia Voting
Rights Act becomes law, it will be challenged before a Court likely to strike
it down.93 There would then be a judicial precedent on the books declaring
that D.C. cannot sit in Congress, and stare decisis would make it harder for
a future Court to go the other way. But if the Court does not engage the is-
sue now, there would be more time for constitutional expectations to
continue shifting. If supporters of enfranchising the District's voters con-
tinue to press their case in public, the chances of the Court's upholding a
future reform law will grow with each passing year. In other words, passing
a law that enfranchises D.C. in the present Congress may be the last, best
hope for locking in a waning set of constitutional expectations and denying
representation to D.C. voters for years to come.
This was probably not the perspective of the senators who succeeded in
amending the pending bill to include a second title before it passed the Sen-
ate. That second title, called the Second Amendment Enforcement Act,
92. Nonjusticiability could come in the form of either concluding that no plaintiff had stand-
ing to challenge the law or determining under the political question doctrine that, within broad
parameters, a decision to broaden the electorate represented in Congress is the province of Congress
itself. Either way, one benefit of the judiciary's declining to weigh in on the matter would be that
enfranchising the District of Columbia would not force courts to confront the question of whether
other presently unrepresented American jurisdictions must also have voting seats in the House of
Representatives. Many people who recognize the injustice of disfranchising the District of Colum-
bia's half-million residents worry that acknowledging a principle that would cure that problem
would also require representation for Guam, the Virgin Islands, and all other American-Flag juris-
dictions. Some of these territories are tiny, and the idea of giving each one its own Representatives
might seem absurd. Nor can the problem be sensibly solved by grouping all the residual jurisdic-
tions together into a "miscellaneous territories" district, given the enormous diversity of the political
situations of the relevant populations. Fear of entering this swamp may persuade some people that
the wiser course is simply not to enfranchise the District of Columbia in the first place: a Court that
ruled on constitutional grounds that American citizens in the District of Columbia must be permitted
to elect a voting member of the House of Representatives would either have to endorse the same
principle for these other territories or else explain why not. This problem only presents itself, how-
ever, if the courts were to rule affirmatively that District residents are constitutionally entitled to
voting representation. If instead the courts declared the issue nonjusticiable, the problem would not
arise. The question of whether to extend the franchise would be left with Congress, and Congress
would be free to extend the principle or not as it judged appropriate.
93. As noted in the previous footnote, a Court persuaded of the wisdom of not passing on the
constitutionality of the Act might conclude that no plaintiff had standing to challenge the law. But
standing doctrine being what it is, it is at least equally easy to imagine a Court convinced of the
law's unconstitutionality finding that some plaintiff did have standing to bring a constitutional chal-
lenge.
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would repeal D.C.'s ban on semiautomatic weapons.94 The bill as passed by
the Senate would thus give the District a voting seat in the House of Repre-
sentatives and also eliminate a large portion of the District's remaining gun
control laws. Many representatives who favor letting the District have a vote
also support firearms regulation, so this tactic has put them to a choice of
evils, and the inclusion of the weapons provision may have been intended to
prevent the overall bill from becoming law. All twenty-three of the amend-
ment's sponsors voted against final passage of the Act;95 many or even all of
them probably hold the good-faith belief that giving the District a vote in the
House would be unconstitutional. But if the Second Amendment Enforce-
ment Act scuttles the District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act, the
senators who promoted it will have done an important if unintended service
to the long-term project of enfranchising the District's voters. If the firearms
amendment makes the House of Representatives balk, the issue will go
away for a while. The present Supreme Court will not decide the constitu-
tional question. Constitutional expectations will continue to change. And
one day, the issue will return, perhaps to be adjudicated in a Court that is
more ready to say yes, or at least to stay out of the way.
CONCLUSION
The District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act is now before the
House of Representatives. If it reaches the President's desk-with or with-
out the firearms provision attached-a constitutionally sophisticated chief
executive will have to decide what to do. He will know that signing the bill
would attract reams of criticism, and ridicule, from people who think of
themselves as good-faith textualists. If misplacing a word in the oath was
dicey, adding a seat in Congress could be downright explosive. Without a
doubt, the President would be accused of ignoring the Constitution. Given
the present state of constitutional expectations, many people thinking about
the matter in good faith would find the accusation credible.
Others would have a different understanding. No less sincerely, they
would see the Act as vindicating the Constitution's central democratic prin-
ciples. Over time, their numbers would grow. Constitutional expectations
cannot long avoid mapping the facts on the ground, especially when those
facts conform to our basic principles. Down the road, it would seem strange
that District residents were ever denied political representation, just as it
94. See District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2009, Title H - Second Amendment
Enforcement Act. The semiautomatic weapon ban still stands after District of Columbia v. Heller,
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), which struck down a ban on the use of handguns and other firearms com-
monly used for self-defense in the home.
95. Compare S. Amdt. 575 to S. 160, Feb. 25, 2009 (introduced by Senator Ensign and co-
sponsored by Senators Vitter Coburn. DeMint, Burr, Wicker, Thune, Grassley, Risch, Inhofe,
Bennett, Enzi, Chambliss, Isakson, Crapo, Comyn, Brownback, Corker, Martinez, Murkowski,
Graham, Roberts, and Barrasso), with U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 11Ith Cong. on Passage of S. 160
As Amended, supra note 24 (recording Senate roll-call vote on District of Columbia House Voting
Rights Act of 2009).
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seems strange now that individual equality rights guaranteed to state resi-
dents might not have applied in the District as well.
Future readers of Article I might wonder why D.C. could sit in Con-
gress, given the language about "states." But the fact that D.C. did sit in
Congress would go a long way toward persuading them that the text was
consistent with the practice. If some of them were not persuaded-if they
insisted that the practice contradicts the text and that constitutional text must
be read strictly-then they might suspect that the President who signed the
law making it happen failed to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution
of the United States. But if so, they would have trouble explaining what
happened on the day, or days, when he swore to do so.
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